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UNFETTERED DISCRETION: A CLOSER 
LOOK AT THE BOARD’S DISCRETION TO 
DENY INSTITUTION 
JOEL D. SAYRES & REID E. DODGE* 
In enacting inter partes review (“IPR”) in the America Invents Act 
(“AIA”), Congress intended to solve a specific problem—the inability of 
the then-existing administrative alternative to district court litigation 
(inter partes reexamination) to efficiently and effectively address pa-
tent validity based on patents and printed publications. Congress thus 
created IPRs as a complete substitute for litigation on this issue, and 
provided a procedural framework that would allow and encourage 
parties to avail themselves of this administrative remedy. 
To ensure that the doorway to IPRs was not limitless, Congress 
delineated a specific threshold before a trial could be instituted. That 
threshold is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that IPR 
may not be instituted unless the petition “shows that there is a reason-
able likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 
1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” However, the Board has in-
creasingly identified circumstances in which it will not institute IPR, 
even where a petitioner satisfies this statutory threshold. Indeed, the 
Board has seemingly adopted the view that it has essentially unfet-
tered discretion to deny institution, separate and apart from the “rea-
sonable likelihood” standard. As explained below, neither the text of 
Section 314(a) nor the legislative history of the AIA appears to support 
the Board’s view; moreover, this interpretation may be hindering Con-
gress’ intent to provide an effective administrative alternative to litiga-
tion on the issue of patent validity. 
 
* Joel Sayres is a partner in the Denver office of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. Reid 
Dodge is an associate in the Indianapolis office of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. The views 
expressed herein belong solely to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Faegre Drinker 
Biddle & Reath LLP or its clients. 
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I. IPRS AS A “COMPLETE SUBSTITUTE” FOR LITIGATION AND A FIX 
FOR INTER PARTES REEXAMINATIONS 
Congress created IPRs1 in response to “a growing sense that ques-
tionable patents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to chal-
lenge.”2 Indeed, the “uniform and compelling” legislative record makes 
clear that IPRs were intended to address the problems of burdensome 
litigation by providing a “complete alternative and complete substitu-
tion” for district court litigation regarding validity based on patents 
and printed publications under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.3 In Congress’ 
view, such a substitution would enable the critical validity issue to be 
decided by patent experts4 in a relatively short timeframe, thus in-
creasing patent quality and avoiding many of the problems and costs 
inherent in district court patent litigation.5 
Importantly, at the time the AIA was enacted, an administrative 
avenue for challenging patents already existed—inter partes reexami-
nation proceedings.  This predecessor was also intended to “serve as 
 
 1.  Although this article focuses on IPRs, the discussion herein is also pertinent to post 
grant review (“PGR”) and covered business method review (“CBMR”) proceedings, both of which 
are creations of the AIA. 
 2.  America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. 1, at 39 (2011) (as reported by the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, June 1, 2011).  
 3.  SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (“The AIA proceeding is structured as a complete alternative to litigation of these 
issues.”); see also id. at 1355–60; 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl) (“Ideally, extending could-have-raised estoppel to privies will help ensure that if an inter 
partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that review will completely substitute for at 
least the patents-and-printed publications portion of the civil litigation.”); 157 CONG. REC. S5409 
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (stating that the AIA “streamlines review of 
patents to ensure that the poor-quality patents can be weeded out through administrative review 
rather than costly litigation”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (stating the purpose of IPRs 
is to “provid[e] quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”); Patent Reform: The Future of 
American Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) (state-
ment of Jon Dudas, Director, USPTO) (stating that “the estoppel needs to be quite strong” and “is 
intended to allow nothing—a complete alternative to litigation”). 
 4.  See 157 CONG. REC. S1352 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Udall) (“[A] panel of 
experts is more likely to reach the correct decision on a technical question compared to a jury 
composed of laypeople.”); Perspective on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 77, at 51 
(2005) (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, 
General Electric Co., and former USPTO Director) (The “USPTO is a particularly appropriate venue 
for making validity determinations in a cost-effective and technically sophisticated environ-
ment.”). 
 5.  See SAS Inst.,  825 F.3d at 1354 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“In providing a meaningful al-
ternative to district court litigation of these primary issues of patent validity, Congress designed 
the AIA to achieve expeditious and economical final resolution.”) (citing Patent Reform Act of 
2009: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 153 (2009) (statement of Rep. 
Manzullo) (“It is clearly appropriate to have an administrative process for challenging patent va-
lidity, but it should exist within a structure that guarantees a quick—and final—determination.”)). 
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an effective and efficient alternative to often costly and protracted dis-
trict court litigation.”6 However, to many in Congress, inter partes 
reexamination had simply “broken down,”7 plagued by limitations that 
“proved to make it a less viable alternative to litigation for evaluating 
patent validity than Congress intended.”8 Indeed, studies showed that 
inter partes reexaminations were used infrequently.9  Accordingly, one 
central purpose of enacting IPRs in the AIA was to remedy the short-
comings of inter partes reexamination—and thereby encourage parties 
to again avail themselves of an agency alternative to district court liti-
gation for determining the crucial issue of patent validity.10 
II. SECTION 314(A) AND THE EVOLUTION OF BOARD DISCRETION TO 
DENY INSTITUTION 
Despite Congress’ intent for IPRs to serve as a substitute for dis-
trict court litigation and an effective fix for inter partes reexamination, 
extra-congressional barriers to IPRs appear to be steadily growing. 
Specifically, the Board has increasingly identified circumstances in 
which it will not institute IPR, even where a petitioner satisfies the 
statutory threshold for institution set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which 
provides: 
Threshold. The Director may not authorize an inter partes review 
to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information 
presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response 
filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
 
 6.  America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. 1, at 45 (2011) (as reported by the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, June 1, 2011). 
 7.  157 CONG. REC. S5374 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) (“Admin-
istrative processes that should serve as an alternative to litigation also have broken down, result-
ing in further delay, cost, and confusion.”). 
 8.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 60–61 (2011). 
 9.  See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Report to Congress on Inter Partes Reex-
amination (2004), at 5 (documenting only 53 requests for inter partes reexamination over a five-
year period ending in 2004); see also 157 CONG. REC. S1352 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Udall) (noting that inter partes reexamination was “intended to serve as a less-expensive al-
ternative to courtroom litigation and provide additional access to the expertise of the Patent Of-
fice on questions of patentability,” but that the process “was not frequently used . . . because of 
procedural restrictions in the existing law”). 
 10.  See 157 CONG. REC. S5374 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) (“The 
America Invents Act . . . will improve administrative processes so that disputes over patents can 
be resolved quickly and cheaply without patents being tied up for years in expensive litigation.”); 
157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“[T]he bill would im-
prove the current inter partes administrative process for challenging the validity of a patent.”); see 
also SAS Inst., 825 F.3d at 1359 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legislative history is clear that the 
AIA inter partes review proceedings were designed to correct inadequacies plaguing [inter partes 
reexamination].”). 
UNFETTERED DISCRETION 5/26/2020  6:45 PM 
2020  UNFETTERED DISCRETION 539 
the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims 
challenged in the petition.11 
In fact, the Board has seemingly adopted the view that it has es-
sentially unfettered discretion to deny institution12—a view that re-
flects an evolution in the Board’s interpretation of Section 314(a). 
A. Early Board Decisions Regarding Discretionary Denial 
At the onset of the AIA, the Board appeared to view 35 U.S.C. § 
314(a) as establishing the threshold standard for institution and noth-
ing more.13 While the Board recognized that this threshold standard 
allowed for some level of discretion,14 there was little indication that 
the Board viewed this discretion as extending beyond the confines of 
the “reasonable likelihood” of success standard, let alone that this dis-
cretion was essentially without limit.15 
The Board did, however, recognize its ability to exercise addition-
al discretion based on other statutory authority. Specifically, the Board 
recognized that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) allowed it to account for the cumula-
tive or redundant nature of the art and arguments presented in the pe-
tition.16 As the Board initially made clear, the cumulative/redundant 
 
 11.  35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board institutes trial on behalf of the Director. See 37 C.F.R. § 
42.4(a). 
 12.  The Board’s decision denying institution is technically limited by the Administrative 
Procedure Act—e.g., such a decision cannot be arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706. However, if 
Section 314(a) gives the Board discretion to identify new rationales for denying institution—see 
infra § II.C—then it is hard to imagine the Federal Circuit finding a discretionary denial to be arbi-
trary and capricious as long as the Board provides some “modest” notice. See In re Power Integra-
tions, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Moreover, review of discretionary denials are all 
the more difficult because such arguments must be made in the rigorous mandamus framework. 
See id. at 1318–21. 
 13.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 48755, 48765 (“In instituting the trial, the Board will consider whether 
or not a party has satisfied the relevant statutory institution standard.”); see also, e.g., Microsoft 
Corp. v. ProxyConn, Inc., No. IPR2012-00026, Paper 17 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2012) (“The stand-
ard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).”); Chimei Innolux Corp. 
v. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., Ltd., No. IPR2013-00066, Paper 10 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 24, 2013) 
(same). 
 14.  77 Fed. Reg. 48755, 48765 (“The ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard is a somewhat flexible 
standard that allows the Board room to exercise judgment.”). 
 15.  During the notice and comment rulemaking process for IPR regulations, the PTO did 
aver that the Board could decline to institute where the review could not be timely completed, 
noting egregious examples of where a petition “seeks review of several hundred claims based up-
on a thousand references,” or where “a patent owner demonstrates that a determination of pa-
tentability would require dozens of depositions of non-party controlled witnesses in foreign 
countries.” 77 Fed. Reg. 48680, 48702 (response to comment 57). However, the PTO did not con-
tend that § 314(a) conferred this discretion, nor cite any other authority to support this position. 
See id. Nor did the PTO identify other situations in which the Board would have such discretion to 
deny independent of the “reasonable likelihood” standard for institution. 
 16.  35 U.S.C. § 325(d). 
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nature of the art and arguments presented was to be “part of its con-
sideration” in determining whether the threshold reasonable likeli-
hood of success standard had been met.17 
B. Increasing Reliance on Section 314(a) to Deny Institution 
Within a couple years, the Board began to look to Section 314(a) 
as a basis to deny petitions, independent of the reasonable likelihood 
standard. It appears this development may have been spurred by peti-
tions imposing burdens on the Board that it regarded as unreasonable. 
For example, in the 2014 IPR Zetec, the Board was confronted with a 
petition asserting 127 grounds of unpatentability.18 While in the 2012 
Liberty Mutual CBMR the Board ordered the petitioner to choose sub-
sets of 422 obviousness grounds to remain and then went on to insti-
tute on a subset of grounds,19 the Board in Zetec instead looked to Sec-
tion 314(a), noting that “[t]he standard for institution is written in 
permissive terms—identifying when the [Office] is authorized to insti-
tute an inter partes review. Thus, Congress has given the Office discre-
tion whether to institute a review or not institute a review.”20 The Board 
went on to deny institution based on this interpretation of Section 
314(a).21 
 
 17.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 48755, 48765 (“As part of its consideration, the Board may take into 
account whether the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments were previously pre-
sented to the Office under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).”); see also Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., 
Inc., No. IPR2013-00371, Paper 11 at 13 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2013) (“We decline the invitation [to 
exercise our discretion under § 325(d)], because we determine that Amneal has demonstrated a 
reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable.”). 
 18.  Zetec, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., No. IPR2014-00384, Paper 10 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. 
July 23, 2014). 
 19.  Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., No. CBM2012-
00003, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty In-
surance Co., No. CBM2012-00003,. Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2013).  
 20.  Zetec, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., No. IPR2014-00384, Paper 10 at 5 (P.T.A.B. July 
23, 2014) (emphasis added). 
 21.  Id. at 16. The Board also cited 37 C.F.R. § 42.108, which has three subsections. Subsec-
tion (a) provides that “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board may authorize the review 
to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatent-
ability asserted for each claim”; subsection (b) provides that “[a]t any time prior to institution of 
inter partes review, the Board may deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of 
the challenged claims”; and subsection (c) sets forth, inter alia, the “reasonable likelihood” stand-
ard of Section 314(a) and what the Board must take into account in applying this standard. 37 
C.F.R. § 108. Thus, the only two subsections that speak to Board discretion are (a) and (b). How-
ever, subsection (a) (partial institution) was effectively struck down by the Supreme Court as not 
supported by the statutory text. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1360 (2018). It 
would seem that even if subsection (b) provided for Board discretion at the time of institution (as 
opposed to “prior to institution”), it would also necessarily fall if not supported by the text of the 
AIA. See infra n.40 and accompanying text. 
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As the Board began to increasingly apply discretionary denial un-
related to the “reasonable likelihood” standard for institution,22 it 
seemingly found support from the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court. In Harmonic, the Federal Circuit noted that “the PTO is permit-
ted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”23 Less than 
four months later, the Supreme Court in Cuozzo noted that “the agen-
cy’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Of-
fice’s discretion.”24 Both decisions based their conclusion solely on the 
text of Section 314(a).25 
Two years later, the Supreme Court in SAS struck down partial in-
stitution.26 In rejecting the Director’s argument that Section 314(a) af-
fords the Board discretion to institute on fewer than all claims, the 
Court seemingly agreed with prior interpretations of the statute.27 
However, the decision also now meant that if the Board instituted, it 
would have to institute on all claims.28 The PTO responded to the new 
potential for burdens on the Office by making clear that it would exer-
cise its discretion to deny petitions under Section 314(a) in cases in-
volving voluminous or excessive grounds, a low percentage of asserted 
 
 22.  See, e.g., HTC Corp. v. E-Watch, Inc., No. IPR2014-00987, Paper 10 at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 
2015) (determining that under Section 314(a), the Board may deny grounds without substantive 
analysis); NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. IPR2016-00134, Paper 9 at 6–7 (P.T.A.B. May 4, 
2016) (first setting forth factors for consideration in exercising discretion as to whether to insti-
tute). 
 23.  Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Technology, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 24.  Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). Notably, Justice Alito in his 
dissent questioned this interpretation of Section 314(a). See infra note 42. 
 25.  See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140; Harmonic, 815 F.3d at 1367. The Supreme Court in Cuozzo 
also cited 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2); however, that provision simply provides that the statutory section 
governing judicial review applies except to the extent that “agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.” 
 26.  SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1348. 
 27.  Id. at 1356 (concluding that “while § 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the 
question whether to institute review, it doesn’t follow that the statute affords him discretion re-
garding what claims that review will encompass”). Notably, the statements in Harmonic, Cuozzo, 
and SAS subsequently cited by the Board as supporting its interpretation of Section 314(a) are 
cursory, without any analysis on this issue other than citation to the text of Section 314(a). See 
supra note 25. Arguably, the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court viewed this discretion as limited 
to evaluation of the “reasonable likelihood” threshold for institution, or—in the pre-SAS cases of 
Harmonic and Cuozzo—as directed to discretion to partially institute a proceeding. In any event, 
because this authority all rests on the text of Section 314(a), it bears questioning whether the text 
of the statute truly supports this interpretation, as discussed infra in Section III.A. 
 28.  Id. at 1354, 1360. Shortly after the SAS decision, the PTO issued its own guidance, con-
firming that the Board would thereafter “institute on all challenges raised in the petition or not 
institute at all (i.e., it will be a binary decision).” USPTO, SAS Q&As (June 5, 2018),  
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sas_qas_20180605.pdf.  
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claims or grounds that meet the “reasonable likelihood” threshold, or 
indefinite claims.29 
C. Current Landscape of Discretionary Denials 
Since SAS, the Board has not only followed through on this guid-
ance, but has also identified additional situations in which it may deny 
a petition under Section 314(a) even where there is a reasonable like-
lihood of success as to at least one of the challenged claims.30 For ex-
ample, in Biofrontera, the Board determined that the petitioner had 
“established a reasonable likelihood of success on only 1 of 8 grounds,” 
which included the “sole independent claim” and two additional 
claims.31 Despite recognizing that the petitioner had “met the statutory 
threshold for institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a),” the Board declined 
institution.32 Similarly, in Deeper, the petitioner challenged twenty-
three claims under four asserted grounds but “demonstrate[d] a rea-
sonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to only two claims on one 
asserted ground.”33 For this reason, the Board declined institution, rea-
soning that it “would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and re-
sources” to institute IPR.34 
Other contexts in which the Board has exercised its ability to de-
cline institution include situations in which a petitioner files multiple 
petitions that do not meet certain criteria,35 where the petitioner—or 
even a co-defendant or supplier of the petitioner—has already filed a 
 
 29.  See SAS Q&As, supra note 28.  
 30.  Biofrontera Inc.  v. DUSA Pharms., No. IPR2018-01585, Paper 10 at 14–15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 
26, 2019); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., No. IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at 41–43 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 
2019) (designated informative); Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., No. IPR2018-
00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2018); see also USPTO, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 
at 58 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf?MURL= 
(recognizing that there may be reasons that favor “denying a petition even though some claims 
meet the threshold standards for institution”) [hereinafter “2019 Trial Practice Guide”],. 
 31.  Biofrontera Inc.  v. DUSA Pharms., No. IPR2018-01585, Paper 10 at 14 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 
2019) 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., No. IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at 42–43 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 
2019). 
 34.  Id. at 43; see also Biofrontera Inc.  v. DUSA Pharms., No. IPR2018-01585, Paper 10 at 15 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2019) (“[T]his case presents a clear instance where the benefits of holding a trial 
to resolve the challenges having a reasonable likelihood would be overwhelmed by the burden of 
addressing the challenges having no reasonable likelihood.”). 
 35.  See 2019 Trial Practice Guide, supra note 30, at 59 (“[O]ne petition should be sufficient 
to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.”). 
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petition,36 or where a related district court litigation is in an advanced 
stage relative to the IPR.37 Thus, the Board has seemingly evolved from 
exercising discretionary denial where a petition presents voluminous, 
excessive, or previously considered grounds, to additional areas unre-
lated to the merits of the petition. Indeed, it appears that the Board 
considers its discretion to deny institution under Section 314(a) to be 
virtually limitless.38 
III. IS THIS WHAT CONGRESS INTENDED? 
The Board’s position that Section 314(a) gives it complete discre-
tion to deny institution raises several questions. Is such an expansive 
view of discretionary denial supported by the plain language of the 
statute, and is it consistent with other statutes governing IPR? Does it 
find support in the legislative history? What practical implications does 
it have for parties and practitioners? 
A. Statutory Text 
It would seem that the Board’s expansive view of its discretion to 
deny institution has, at best, tenuous support in the text of § 314(a). 
Indeed, nothing in the statute states that the Board has discretion to 
deny institution where the petition otherwise meets the threshold cri-
teria for institution.39 Just as the Supreme Court rejected the notion 
 
 36.  See, e.g., General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357, 
Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential); Valve Corp. v. Elec. Scripting Prods., Inc., No. 
IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential); PayPal, Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC, 
No. IPR2019-00884, Paper 22 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 3, 2019). 
 37.  Thermo Fisher Sci., Inc. v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, No. IPR2018-01370, 
Paper 11 at 25–27 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 7, 2019); NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex, No. IPR2018-00752, Paper 
8 at 19–20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); NetApp, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLC, No. 
IPR2017-01195, Paper 9 at 8–13 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 12, 2017); see also Jasper Tran et al., Discretionary 
Denials of IPR Institution, 19 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 253 (2019) (summarizing NHK and sim-
ilar decisions). 
 38.  See, e.g., 2019 Trial Practice Guide, supra note 30, at 55 (“In deciding whether to insti-
tute the trial, the Board considers at a minimum whether or not a party has satisfied the relevant 
statutory institution standard.”) (emphasis added); id. at 58 (“[P]arties may wish to address in 
their submissions whether any other such reasons exist in their case that may give rise to addi-
tional factors that may bear on the Board’s discretionary decision to institute or not institute.”) 
(emphasis added); General Plastic, No. IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 19 (precedential) (“We also 
do not agree that the legislative history indicates an intent to limit discretion under § 314(a).”). 
 39.  See Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (starting with what the 
statute “expressly states” in its interpretive analysis); Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 
U.S. 338, 353 (2013) (“Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate.”); United States v. 
Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–241 (1989) (“[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent 
and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the 
statute.”). 
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that the Board had discretion to partially institute based on lack of a 
clear statutory mandate, so too would that logic appear to apply here.40 
This is particularly so where the legislative history underscores that 
Congress wanted to fix the problem of infrequent use of inter partes 
reexaminations.41 If the goal was to increase the use of an administra-
tive alternative to litigation, it would seem unfettered discretion to de-
ny institution runs counter to this goal, and thus Congress would have 
been explicit if it intended to confer such unbounded discretion.42 
While the text of Section 314(a) provides room for the Board to exer-
cise judgment, that judgment appears confined to the “reasonable like-
lihood” of success standard.43 
Moreover, the Board’s expansive view of its discretion to deny in-
stitution under Section 314(a) also seems to render superfluous Sec-
tion 325(d),44 which expressly states that the Board “may take into ac-
count whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or 
substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were pre-
sented to the Office.”45 If Congress intended Section 314(a) to provide 
the Board with unfettered discretion to deny institution, Section 
325(d) would be unnecessary, as the Board could already account for 
the same prior art/arguments previously presented to the Office 
through Section 314(a).46 
 
 40.  Cf. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 13545 (2018) (“In the Director’s view, he re-
tains discretion to decide which claims make it into an inter partes review and which don’t. The 
trouble is, nothing in the statute says anything like that. The Director’s claimed ‘partial institution’ 
power appears nowhere in the text of § 318, or anywhere else in the statute for that matter.”). 
 41.  Supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
 42.  See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I agree that one can infer from the 
statutory scheme that the Patent Office has discretion to deny inter partes review even if a chal-
lenger satisfies the threshold requirements for review. But the law does not say so directly and 
Congress may not have thought the point self-evident.”). 
 43.  77 Fed. Reg. 48755, 48765 (“The ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard is a somewhat flexible 
standard that allows the Board room to exercise judgment.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (rejecting a statutory interpretation that rendered § 
314(d) “superfluous”); SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1355 (accounting for a “closely related statute” in its 
statutory interpretation analysis). 
 45.  35 U.S.C. § 325(d); see also 77 Fed. Reg. 48755, 48765. 
 46.  The Board rejected this argument in its General Plastic precedential opinion, reasoning 
that the use of the word “may” in Section 325(d) “manifest[ed] the discretionary nature of appli-
cation” of that subsection, thus indicating that “§ 325(d) is not intended to be the sole factor in the 
exercise of discretion under § 314(a).” General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, 
No. IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) Again, however, Section 325(d) does 
not state that it is setting forth criteria to be considered by the Board in exercising some separate-
ly conferred discretion. It thus is debatable whether the Board’s analysis fully confronts the issue 
of why a statute setting forth particular circumstances in which institution may be denied would 
be necessary if another statute provides unfettered discretion to deny institution.  
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B. Legislative Record 
As discussed above, the legislative history of the AIA evidences 
Congress’ intent to make IPRs more desirable than inter partes reex-
aminations as an alternative to litigation on questions of validity.47 As 
such, it would appear reasonable to interpret Section 314(a) as setting 
forth the specific threshold for institution, with the presumption that if 
this threshold is met, trial would be instituted. Nothing in the legisla-
tive history reflects an intent that the Board have unfettered discretion 
to deny institution. 
This is not to say that Congress was unaware of the concern that 
high institution rates may tax the Board’s resources. In fact, Congress 
specifically contemplated that regulations implementing IPRs might 
include “a safety valve that allows the Office to decline to institute fur-
ther proceedings if a high volume of pending proceedings threatens 
the Office’s ability to timely complete all proceedings.”48 However, 
Congress made clear that if the Board were to implement this regula-
tion and reject a petition on this basis, “rather than on the basis of a 
failure to satisfy the substantive standards of the threshold[] in section 
314 . . . , it is expected that the Office will make this fact clear when re-
jecting the petition” so as not to prejudice the petitioner’s ability to 
bring similar invalidity arguments in other tribunals.49 
As with Section 325(d), the contemplated “safety valve” evidences 
that Congress had specific instances in mind of when the Board might 
have discretion to turn away a petitioner who otherwise satisfies the 
statutory criteria for institution. Even then, Congress indicated expec-
tations for what the Board would say in exercising this discretion, so as 
not to deter petitioners from using IPRs.50 This further suggests that if 
Congress intended the Board to have unfettered discretion to deny in-
stitution, it would have made this known.51 And in any event, the Board 
 
 47.  Supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
 48.  157 Cong. Rec. S1377 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 49.  Id. Congress also included within the AIA a provision allowing the Director to place a 
limit on the number of IPRs that would be instituted in the first four years the proceedings were 
in effect. Id. at S1376-77. As with the safety valve, Congress indicated that if the Office were to 
reject a petition on this basis, it would make this clear. Id. at S1377. This was to prevent a “chal-
lenger with strong invalidity arguments” from being “deterred from using inter partes or post-
grant review by fear that his petition might be rejected” on the basis of procedure, yet have that 
“fact of the rejection . . . be employed by the patent owner in civil litigation to suggest that the ex-
perts at the Patent Office found no merit in the challenger’s arguments”. 
 50.  Id. at S1376-77.  
 51.  The Board rejected this argument in General Plastic, determining that the legislative his-
tory “does not limit the exercise of discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to only circumstances in 
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never enacted a regulation establishing a “safety valve,”52 and has not 
denied institution on this basis; rather, the Board has pointed to gen-
eral concerns regarding efficiency as supporting discretionary denial.53 
C. Practical Implications 
The Board’s reading of Section 314(a) as providing unfettered dis-
cretion has significant practical implications for parties in light of some 
of the characteristics of IPRs. For example, IPR regulations and case 
law require a petitioner to set forth its entire invalidity case with re-
spect to patents and printed publications.54 This encompasses consid-
erable effort and expense.55 Thus, initiating an IPR comes with high 
stakes, and if there is a tangible threat of discretionary denial apart 
from the merits, this may increasingly counsel petitioners against 
availing themselves of this administrative substitute.56 
In addition, petitioners subject to discretionary denial have essen-
tially no recourse because the determination of whether to institute an 
IPR is “final and nonappealable.”57 While decisions to institute that fall 
outside the Board’s statutory limits, implicate due process concerns, or 
otherwise involve “shenanigans” may nonetheless be reviewable,58 no 
such guardrails exist for discretionary denials because the Board could 
 
which there is a high volume of pending proceedings.” General Plastic, No. IPR2016-01357, Paper 
19 at 19. In support, the Board cited the page of the Congressional Record discussing the safety 
valve. Id. However, the only other discussion of institution denial on that page is in reference to 
the contemplated potential limits on IPRs within the first four years of the proceeding. See 157 
CON. REC., supra, note 49, at S1376-77. It is thus questionable whether this part of the Congres-
sional Record supports a reading of Section 314(a) as providing unfettered discretion to deny 
institution.   
 52.  See 77 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 48702. 
 53.  See, e.g.,  Biofrontera Inc. v. DUSA Pharms., No. IPR2018-01585, Paper 10 at 15 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb. 26, 2019); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., No. IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at 43 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 
2019) (designated informative); Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., No. IPR2018-
00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2018) 
 54.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge, Ltd., 
821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR 
proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the 
‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 
312(a)(3)); Kingston Tech. Co. v. Imation Corp., No. IPR2015-00066, Paper 19 at 27–28 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 24, 2016) (“[T]he Petition must contain the argument and evidence necessary to support 
Petitioner’s case.”).  
 55.  See Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., Report of the Economic 
Survey, 52 (2019) (estimating petition preparation costs of approximately $100,000).  
 56.  It is possible that the downturn in IPR filings in 2019 is in part attributable to concerns 
over discretionary denial. See 2019 Year in Review, DOCKET NAVIGATOR, 2 (representing that the 
number of new filings at the PTAB dropped 23% in 2019). 
 57.  35 U.S.C. § 314(d).  
 58.  Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141-42 (2016). 
UNFETTERED DISCRETION 5/26/2020  6:45 PM 
2020  UNFETTERED DISCRETION 547 
always simply invoke its discretion under Section 314(a).59 Again, such 
unfettered discretion may increasingly deter petitioners from pursing 
this avenue of challenging patents. 
CONCLUSION 
There are legitimate reasons for affording the Board some level of 
discretion in determining whether to institute review. If the Board 
were consistently faced with voluminous challenges, it may become 
quickly overburdened, and patent owners may be prejudiced by having 
to defend repeated challenges. Indeed, it appears the Board has been 
conscientious about balancing these competing interests.60 
However, the legislative history indicates that Congress was well 
aware of these concerns, and identified multiple ways of addressing 
them—including Section 312(a)(3) (requiring petitioners to set forth 
their grounds and evidence with particularity); Section 325(d) (per-
mitting the Board to deny institution where the same or substantially 
the same prior art or arguments were presented to the Office); and po-
tential regulations incorporating a safety valve. If additional discretion 
is warranted, it should come from Congress, not an interpretation of 
Section 314(a) that provides unfettered discretion to deny institution. 
Such an interpretation does not appear to be supported by the text of 
the statute, seems at odds with the legislative history of the AIA, and is 
threatening to undermine Congress’ intent of removing barriers to 
administrative alternatives to litigation. 
 
 
 59.  See supra note 12. 
 60.  See, e.g., Nautilus Hyosung Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., No. IPR2017-00426, Paper 17 at 11 
(P.T.A.B. June 22, 2017) (“We do not take lightly denying a petition on grounds unrelated to its 
substantive patentability challenges. Rather, in determining whether to exercise our discretion to 
deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we seek to balance the equities between the parties, 
including Petitioner’s desire to be heard against Patent Owner’s interest in avoiding harass-
ment.”). 
